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Abstract 
 
This paper will focus on the meaning of the terms resident, United States and residence as they 
are used in the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 United States Code (U.S.C.).  The general 
meanings of these terms vary depending upon the purpose of the legislation.  As will be shown, 
Congress has expressly defined their meaning in the Internal Revenue Code (hereafter, IRC) to the 
exclusion of all others.  While several articles [1] have been written discussing the meaning 
Congress intended these terms for purposes of federal income taxation, no article, annotation or 
book has viewed the meaning of these terms from the perspective of the U.S. Constitution and how 
they have been interpreted using fundamental principles of statutory construction in court cases. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
he meaning of the terms resident, United States, and residence may be evident, however, the inquiry of 
this paper was prompted by the increase, in recent years, of dozens of cases across the United States, 
where U.S. citizens who consider themselves putative taxpayers have challenged their federal income 
tax liability on the basis that they are nonresident aliens who have no income subject to federal income taxation.  All 
of these cases are based on one of two contentions: a) Each of the individual States of the Union are separate and 
distinct foreign countries to each other as well as the United States (i.e., Washington, D.C., federal enclaves, U.S. 
possessions and territories), and therefore, individuals not born in these locations are aliens; and if not living in these 
areas they are nonresident, thus they are nonresident aliens to the United States; b) There are two types or classes of 
individuals denoted as citizens of the United States.  In the original U.S. Constitution those individuals of African 
and Oriental descent did not qualify as a Citizen of a state or of the United States; and it was only by and through the 
14th Amendment that these individuals acquired citizenship, which was intentionally different from that of the white 
citizens to whom the said amendment did not apply, and thus, all individuals of Anglo-Saxon origin are alien to this 
citizenship.  Further, as only 14th Amendment citizens receive the benefits of the amendment, i.e., the protection of 
the United States government against infringement of their civil rights by any of the state governments, they are 
residents, and therefore, as the white citizens receive no protection from the 14th Amendment they are nonresidents.  
The 14th Amendment definition of citizen of the United States also appears in Treasury Regulation 1.1-1(c) and 
accordingly that is the intended meaning used in the IRC.  However, as this definition does not apply to white 
citizens, therefore, in the terms of the IRC, they are nonresident aliens subject to federal income taxation only under 
the provisions of 26 U.S.C § 871, and not § 1.  Regardless of the theory used, the federal courts at every level have 
unanimously rejected these arguments and all derivatives thereof [2]. 
 
 
T 
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Judicial Construction Of Statutes 
 
 In a general sense statutory construction is that branch of law dealing with the interpretation of laws 
enacted by a legislature. A judicial function required when a statute is invoked and different interpretations are in 
contention.  It is the process, or the art, of determining the sense, real meaning, or proper explanation of obscure or 
ambiguous terms or provisions in a statute, Congressional Record, or oral argument and testimony, or the 
application of such subject to the statute in question, by reasoning in the light derived from extraneous connected 
circumstances of enactment or writings bearing upon the same or a connected matter, or by seeking and applying the 
probable aim and purpose of the provision [3].    
 
All courts use principles of statutory construction to interpret the meanings of words used in statutes. The 
United States Supreme Court uses many sources to assist in the inter-interpretation of the constitution and the 
statutes enacted under its authority [4].  The concepts of law are conveyed and expressed in words.  It is elementary 
when interpreting a law, a written or oral contract, etc., that the meaning and purpose of the words employed be 
clearly understood.  For this reason it is a firmly established principle of statutory interpretation that the words in a 
statute, including revenue acts, should be interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday sense [5].  The 
starting point in every case involving the construction of a statute is the language itself [6] and if its meaning is plain 
it must be accepted without modification and enforced as written unless Congress has definitely indicated an 
intention that they shall be construed otherwise [7].  If the statutory language is clear, it is ordinarily conclusive [8].   
However, if the language is ambiguous, then the courts may properly use the legislative history of the statute to 
reach a conclusion [9] for the intent of the lawmaker constitutes the law and that intent must be sought [10]. 
 
In the absence of a statutory definition, a court construing a statute will start with the assumption that the 
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used, in light of the object and policy of the 
statute [11]. It is not, however, unusual for statutes to contain a definition of the terms used in them.  Statutory 
definitions may appear either in separate sections, or in the body of substantive sections.  It is commonly understood 
that such definitions establish meaning where the terms appear in that same act of in the case of general 
interpretative statutes, the definition extends to as much legislation as the general act itself designates.  As a rule a 
definition that declares what a term means is binding upon the court.  In order to avoid repugnance with other parts 
of the act and conflict with legislative intent, the words may be restricted or expanded by the subject matter.  A term 
whose statutory definition declares what it includes is more susceptible to extension of meaning by construction than 
where the definition declares what a term means [12].  The word includes is usually a term of enlargement, and not 
of limitation.  It therefore, conveys the conclusion that there are other items includable, though not specifically 
enumerated.  A definition which declares what a term means, on the other hand, excludes any meaning that is not 
stated [13].  Statutory definitions of terms used in a statute prevail over colloquial meanings [14].  The commonly 
accepted or dictionary meaning of a term used in a statute is not a substitute for the definition found in the statute 
itself [15].  Nor may a word be imported into a statute in order to change its meaning [16]. 
 
The above-mentioned principles of construction, and all others, apply with equal force to interpretation of 
words or phrases used in the U.S. Constitution.  It is elementary that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land 
[17] and that all statutes enacted by Congress must strictly comply with the language specified by the constitution 
[4].  An excellent illustration of this point occurred in Eisner v. Macomber [18] where the U.S. Supreme Court was 
called upon to interpret the meaning of income in the 16th Amendment, the Court stated:   
 
 “In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from Article I of the Constitution may have proper force and 
effect, save only as modified by the Amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential 
to distinguish between what is and what is not "income," as the term is there used; and to apply the distinction, as 
cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt 
conclude the matter, since it cannot be legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to 
legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.” 
 
 For this very reason Congress is not at liberty to define the meaning of United States or resident outside of 
the intended meaning of those terms in the Constitution and its Amendments.  A fortiori, neither may a litigant who 
Journal of Business & Economics Research                                                                             Volume 1, Number 12 
75 
wishes to impute a meaning of these terms at variance with their ordinary meaning as expressed by the Law of the 
Land or on the face of any statute made in pursuance thereof.   
 
United States Constitution, The 14
th
 Amendment, The Internal Revenue Code And The Immigration And 
Naturalization Act 
 
 In the body of the Constitution appear several references to the term inhabitant Art. I,  § 2, clause 2 (No 
Person shall be a Representative who shall not have … .been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who 
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen.); Art. I, § 3, clause 3 (No Person 
shall be a Senator who shall not have . . .been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when 
elected, be an Inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen.); Art. II, § 1, clause 3 (The Electors shall  . . .vote 
by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves.).  Only 
one reference is made to resident Article II, § 1, clause 5, which reads: "No person except a natural born Citizen, or 
a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of 
President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five 
Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States."  See also these same references for Citizen of 
the United States.  In construing the meaning of these terms:  "Where words are employed in a statute which had at 
the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the laws of this country, those words are presumed to have 
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." [19]  The context in which the terms Inhabitant 
and Resident are used very clearly means an individual who lives within the territorial borders of the United States.  
The term Citizen simply means someone born in this country (a native), or an alien who has been adopted as a native 
citizen under the laws of the United States.  
 
The original Constitution contained no definition of the term citizen of the United States.  This was the case 
until the 14th Amendment became part of the organic law of the United States [20].  Section 1, clause 1 of the 
Amendment reads: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."  The Supreme Court has held that the primary 
purpose of the 14th Amendment was to provide citizenship for those of African descent [21].  The Court drew a 
distinction between citizens of a State and citizens of the United States only stating that the former were ipso facto 
citizens of the United States and already possessed of dual citizenship and were therefore not affected by the 
Amendment.  The latter, by operation of the Amendment, were also included in the same citizenship with its 
attendant privileges and immunities.  In other words, if you are born in the United States and owe no allegiance to a 
foreign power, you are a citizen of the United States; no longer was race a factor in determining such citizenship. 
 
Even though the Constitution contained no definition of citizen prior to the 14th Amendment, Congress is 
expressly authorized by Article I, § 8, clause 4, "To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, . . ."  This is an 
exclusive power; no State has the power to constitute a foreign subject a citizen of the United States [22].  
Naturalization has been defined by the Supreme Court as "the act of adopting a foreigner, and clothing him with the 
privileges of a native citizen." [23]  Qualifications on citizenship are determined by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Laws of the United States and it is not regulated by the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code [24].   
The Immigration and Naturalization Act defines alien as any person not a citizen or national of the United States 
[25] and defines national of the United States as (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a 
citizen of the United States owes permanent allegiance to the United States [26].  In this Act the term United States 
except as otherwise specifically provided, when used in a geographic sense, means the continental United States, 
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States [27]. 
 
The term citizen of United States is defined in the Act at 8 U.S.C. § 1401, where Congress has categorized 
citizens into seven categories: the first merely tracks the language of the first sentence of § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  But there are six other categories of citizens by birth [28].  Subsection (7) citizens must satisfy the 
condition subsequent of five years continuous residence within the United States between the ages of fourteen and 
twenty-eight, a requirement held to be constitutional [29], which means in effect that for constitutional purposes 
according to the prevailing interpretation there is a difference between persons born or naturalized in, that is, within, 
the United States and persons born outside the confines [borders] of the United States who are statutorily made 
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citizens [30].  As defined in the Act the term residence means the place of general abode; the place of general abode 
of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent [31].  
 
In view of the whole purpose intended by the Act it seems rather clear that the United States means the 
whole of the territorial borders comprised of the several States of the Union and the territories and possessions of the 
United States.   To the exclusion of all other meanings, Congress has expressly defined the term United States to 
mean a specific region of land, it has not defined the term in a jurisdictional or political sense under the 14th 
Amendment.  The term residence in the Act, the term resides in the 14th Amendment and the term resident in the 
Constitution simply refer to the physical presence of an individual within a specific region of land, in this case the 
United States.  The term citizen of the United States as defined in the 14th Amendment and the Act, and as used in 
the Constitution primarily means an individual born within the territorial borders of the United States.  Their 
meaning is common and ordinary.  
 
Meaning of United States in the Internal Revenue Code. 
 
History conclusively establishes at the time the Nation identified as the United States of America came into 
being, it was comprised of the original 13 colonies which became states.  Over time the number of states admitted to 
the Union steadily increased.  Today the States of the Union number 50.  It is clear that the Founders of this Nation 
intended to create not only a nation identified as the United States but also a government thereof for the purposes of 
representing the States of the Union in the International community as well as regulating interests common to all of 
the States, e.g., "To Regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes; [and] To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." Article I, § 8, clauses 3 and 4.  At its inception as well 
as today, the terms United States or United States of America as used in the U.S. Constitution, simply mean the 
States collectively as a whole in a general sense, territory comprised of the individual States collectively as a whole, 
and the governing political body representing the States collectively in the World community.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has clearly pronounced and underscored these understandings:   
 
“The term "United States" may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of 
a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. 
It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends,  [*672]  or 
it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution.” [32]   
 
IRC § 7701(a)(9) defines United States "when used in a geographic sense includes only the States and the 
District of Columbia."  This definition is one of limitation as the word 'only' qualifies 'includes.'   
 
 In view of the whole purpose intended by the statute it seems rather clear that the United States means the 
whole of the territorial borders comprised of the several States of the Union and the District of Columbia.  This is in 
keeping with the common and ordinary use of the term in the Constitution respecting citizenship, inhabitant and 
resident.  To the exclusion of all other meanings, the Congress has expressly defined the term United States to mean 
a specific region of land, it has not defined the term in a jurisdictional or political sense under the 14th Amendment.  
Moreover, while Congress has defined United States to mean other areas for purposes of specific statutes, see, for 
example, 26 U.S.C. § 638(1) (the term "United States" when used in a geographical sense includes the seabed and 
subsoil of those submarine areas which are adjacent to the territorial waters of the United States . . ."), and 26 U.S.C. 
§ 3121(e)(2)(The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense, includes the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa."), these other definitions in the IRC only apply to the sub-
title, chapter, section or sub-section intended and are not controlling in other statutes. 
 
Meaning of Resident in the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations. 
 
 The word resident has many meanings in the law, largely determined by the statutory context in which it is 
used [33]. Under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code of New York, residence means living in a 
particular locality and requires bodily presence as inhabitant in a given place [34].  Under the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place [35].  As used in the 
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IRC and Treasury Regulations the term “resident” of the United States is a legally synonymous with a “resident” 
alien individual Treas. Reg. 1.1-1(b). The nexus is the actual presence within the United States.  With the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984, Congress enacted IRC § 7701(b) [36], a definition of the term resident alien applicable for 
income tax purposes [37] and it became effective January 1, 1985.  This definition applies only for purposes of 
calculating an alien's U.S. income tax liability [38]  
 
 When the principles of statutory construction and the plain meaning of the terms residence and resident 
(alien) become redundant and similar in their meaning.  Which consistently states that an alien individual physically 
or actually present in the United States for a specified amount of days, is a resident of the United States for purposes 
of the income tax.  The plain meaning of these terms is in keeping with the Constitution and Laws of the United 
States.  Although the statutes and regulations are clear enough in their meaning, it is always wise to review how the 
Internal Revenue Service and the federal courts interpreted these terms. 
 
 IRS Rulings and Other Case Law. 
 
 A softbound volume entitled "Bulletin Index Digest System, Service 1 Income Tax" [39] contains a listing 
of all Internal Revenue Service Revenue Rulings issued under each Treasury Regulation.  The oldest dates back to 
1959 and the most recent was issued in 1981.  All of these Rev. Rulings pertain to determining residence of alien 
individuals and consistently state the same language.   As an example, the issue in Rev. Ruling 81-70, 1981-1 C.B. 
389, concerned the presumption of nonresidence provided in Treas. Reg. 1.871-4(b) of an alien individual illegally 
present in the United States.  The Service stated: "Thus, the presumption can be overcome by proof of acts and 
statements showing (1) a definite intention to reside in the United States permanently or (2) a stay of an extended 
nature. See, e.g., Marsman v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1953); Rev. Rul. 64-149, 1964-1 (Part I) C.B. 
233, 235." Id. at 390.  The Service concluded that the presumption of nonresidence was overcame by the alien's 
definite intention to reside in the United States on more than a temporary basis as he was here for almost 8 years and 
performed service to and involvement in his community.  The Service stated that under the circumstances the alien 
was a resident of the United States for federal income tax purposes. 
 
The federal courts have consistently interpreted these terms in the same manner as has the Service.  The 
case cited above in Rev. Ruling 81-70 was a proceeding upon a petition to review a decision of the U.S. Tax Court, 
18 T.C. 1, which held that the petitioner, a Philippine citizen, was taxable on all undistributed income of a Philippine 
corporation for the entire year of 1940.  The petitioner had been admitted to the United States on September 22, 
1940 for a temporary period of ten months and who remained in the United States continuously from that date until 
1945, was held to be a resident of the United States for income tax purposes under Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.211-2 even 
though she intended to return to the Philippines after the danger of war in the Orient had subsided. Id. at 338. 
 
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Patino the issue before the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals concerned 
the residence of Cristina deBourbon Patino a national of Spain who in 1940 left Spain for the United States to avoid 
the German invasion.  She was present in the United States from October, 1940 through 1945 occupying an 
apartment in the Plaza Hotel in New York. The court held that: "In passing on this question we are aided by the 
definition of the term "residence" in Regulation 111 § 29.211-2 and by the rules of evidence to be used in 
determining a question of residence in the United States set out in Regulation 111 § 29.211-4 . . . and have been 
approved as a correct exposition of the law by the decisions of this and other courts [40]. Under the rules there set 
out it appears that one who lives in the United States and has no definite intention as to his length of stay is a 
resident; . . .  Certainly this language is descriptive of the taxpayer's sojourn in the United States.  . . . Her long stay 
in New York from year to year despite her separation from her husband and her compete legal and financial freedom 
to go to other lands untroubled by the world conflict, proved beyond any reasonable doubt not only her physical 
presence in the United States but a deliberate intention to reside in this country so long as it might suit her 
convenience."  
 
The revenue rulings and cases discussed above and those cited in the footnotes thoroughly and adequately 
discuss how residence of an alien individual is determined.  In every case (and many more not cited) the courts and 
the Service have unanimously and overwhelmingly held that mere presence in the United States is sufficient to 
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establish residence and once established that individual is a resident of the United States for purposes of the income 
tax.  A holding to the contrary would be at variance with the Constitution and Immigration Laws of the United 
States. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The terms residence and resident of the United States in the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury 
Regulations promulgated thereunder have been consistently interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service, the Tax 
Court, and all federal courts.  The term resident simply means an alien physically and actually present for a specified 
number of days within the territorial borders of the United States.  The term residence simply means an actual 
dwelling place or location within the United States.  The same is true of the term United States as it is used in the 
Internal Revenue Code, the Treasury Regulations, and the Constitution and Immigration Laws of the United States.  
In all sources referenced and discussed in this article the term United States simply means the whole of the territorial 
borders comprised of the several States of the Union and the District of Columbia, and in some statutes the U.S. 
possessions and territories.  There is nothing mystical or deceitful about the meanings of these words.  They have 
common and ordinary meanings and usage as made evident by the dearth of law review articles, annotations, books, 
and the sheer number of federal court cases and revenue rulings. 
 
There are some pretty slick snake oil salesmen out in the community that will be willing, for a fee, of 
course, to lead a taxpayer into the belief that if the taxpayer is a resident of a State then they are not residents of the 
United States, and thus are not “subject to” the Internal Revenue Code and therefore do not have to file their 1040 
any longer. These theories cycle into popularity every five to eight years.  The motives for believing such theories 
are as various as the individuals who “buy into” the belief.  The most destructive prosecutorial (yes, these do end up 
in criminal charges) evidence is the complete absence of a State Tax Return.  It is philosophically indefensible to say 
that you are a State citizen, and therefore are not required to file a Federal income tax return, and then fail to file the 
State income tax return. 
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